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Abstract
Motivated by the quest for scalable and succinct zero knowledge arguments, we revisit worst-case-to-
average-case reductions for linear spaces, raised by [Rothblum, Vadhan, Wigderson, STOC 2013].
The previous state of the art by [Ben-Sasson, Kopparty, Saraf, CCC 2018] showed that if some
member of an affine space U is δ-far in relative Hamming distance from a linear code V – this is the
worst-case assumption – then most elements of U are almost-δ-far from V – this is the average case.
However, this result was known to hold only below the “double Johnson” function of the relative
distance δV of the code V , i.e., only when δ < 1− (1− δV )1/4.
First, we increase the soundness-bound to the “one-and-a-half Johnson” function of δV and
show that the average distance of U from V is nearly δ for any worst-case distance δ smaller than
1 − (1 − δV )1/3. This bound is tight, which is somewhat surprising because the one-and-a-half
Johnson function is unfamiliar in the literature on error correcting codes.
To improve soundness further for Reed Solomon codes we sample outside the box. We suggest a
new protocol in which the verifier samples a single point z outside the box D on which codewords
are evaluated, and asks the prover for the value at z of the interpolating polynomial of a random
element of U . Intuitively, the answer provided by the prover “forces” it to choose one codeword from
a list of “pretenders” that are close to U . We call this technique Domain Extending for Eliminating
Pretenders (DEEP).
The DEEP method improves the soundness of the worst-case-to-average-case reduction for RS
codes up their list decoding radius. This radius is bounded from below by the Johnson bound,
implying average distance is approximately δ for all δ < 1− (1−δV )1/2. Under a plausible conjecture
about the list decoding radius of Reed-Solomon codes, average distance from V is approximately δ
for all δ. The DEEP technique can be generalized to all linear codes, giving improved reductions for
capacity-achieving list-decodable codes.
Finally, we use the DEEP technique to devise two new protocols:
An Interactive Oracle Proof of Proximity (IOPP) for RS codes, called DEEP-FRI. The soundness
of the protocol improves upon that of the FRI protocol of [Ben-Sasson et al., ICALP 2018] while
retaining linear arithmetic proving complexity and logarithmic verifier arithmetic complexity.
An Interactive Oracle Proof (IOP) for the Algebraic Linking IOP (ALI) protocol used to construct
zero knowledge scalable transparent arguments of knowledge (ZK-STARKs) in [Ben-Sasson et
al., eprint 2018]. The new protocol, called DEEP-ALI, improves soundness of this crucial step
from a small constant < 1/8 to a constant arbitrarily close to 1.
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1 Introduction
Arithmetization is a marvelous technique that can be used to reduce problems in computa-
tional complexity, like verifying membership in a nondeterministic language, to questions
about membership of vectors in algebraic codes like Reed-Solomon (RS) and Reed-Muller
(RM) codes [17, 15]. One of the end-points of such a reduction is the RS proximity testing
(RPT) problem. It is a problem of inherent theoretical interest, but also of significant
practical importance because it is used in recent constructions of succinct zero knowledge
(ZK) arguments including Ligero [1], Aurora [5], and Scalable Transparent ARguments of
Knowledge (ZK-STARKs) [2]. We discuss this connection after describing the problem and
our results.
In the RPT problem a verifier is given oracle access to a function f : D → F, we call
D ⊂ F the evaluation domain, and is tasked with distinguishing between the “good” case
that f is a polynomial of degree at most d and the “bad” case in which f is δ-far in relative
Hamming distance from all degree-d polynomials. To achieve succinct verification time,
poly-logarithmic in d, we must allow the verifier some form of interaction with a prover – the
party claiming that deg(f) ≤ d. Initially, this interaction took the form of oracle access to a
probabilistically checkable proof of proximity (PCPP) [7] provided by the prover in addition
to f . Indeed, in this model the RPT problem can be “solved” with PCPPs of quasilinear size
|D|poly log |D|, constant query complexity and constant soundness [11, 13]. However, the
concrete complexity of prover time, verifier time and communication complexity are rather
large, even when considering practical settings that involve moderately small instance sizes.
To improve prover, verifier, and communication complexity for concrete (non-asymptotic)
size problems, the Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity (IOPP) model is more suitable [18,
6, 4]. This model can be viewed as a multi-round PCPP. Instead of having the prover write
down a single proof pi, in the IOPP setting the proof oracle is produced over a number of
rounds of interaction, during which the verifier sends random bits and the prover responds
with additional (long) messages to which the verifier is allowed oracle access. The additional
rounds of interaction allow for a dramatic improvement in the asymptotic and concrete
complexity of solving the RPT problem. In particular, the Fast RS IOPP (FRI) protocol of
[3] has linear prover arithmetic complexity, logarithmic verifier arithmetic complexity and
constant soundness. Our results regarding the RPT problem improve the soundness of this
protocol and offer a better protocol in terms of soundness in the high-error regime (also
known as the “list decoding” regime).
Soundness analysis of FRI reduces to the following natural “worst-case-to-average-case”
question regarding linear spaces, which is also independently very interesting for the case of
general (non-RS) codes. This question was originally raised in a different setting by [20] and
we start by discussing it for general linear codes before focusing on the special, RS code, case.
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1.1 Maximum distance vs average distance to a linear code
Recall that the relative Hamming distance between u, v ∈ FD, denoted ∆(u, v), is the fraction
of entries i ∈ D such that ui 6= vi, and the relative Hamming distance between u and a set
V ⊂ FD is ∆(u, U) = minv∈V ∆(u, v). Suppose that U ⊂ FD is a “line”, a 1-dimensional1
affine space over F. Let u∗ ∈ FD denote the origin of this line and u be its slope, so that
U = {ux = u∗ + xu | x ∈ F}. For a fixed linear space V ⊂ FD, pick u∗ to be the element in
U that is farthest from V , denoting by δmax its relative Hamming distance (from V ). This
is our worst-case assumption. Letting δx = ∆(ux, V ), what can be said about the expected
distance Ex∈F[δx] of ux from V ?
Rothblum, Vadhan and Wigderson showed that Ex[δx] ≥ δmax2 − o(1) for all spaces U and
V , where, here and below, o(1) denotes negligible terms that approach 0 as |F| → ∞ [20].
A subset of the co-authors of this paper [9] improved this to E[δx] ≥ 1−
√
1− δmax − o(1),
showing the average distance scales roughly like the Johnson list-decoding function of δmax,
where J(x) := 1−√1− x. In both of these bounds the expected distance is strictly smaller
than δmax. However, the latter paper also showed that when V is a (linear) error correcting
code with large relative distance δV , if δmax is smaller than the “double Johnson” function of
δV , given by J (2)(x) := J(J(x)), then the average distance hardly deteriorates,
E[δx] ≥ min
(
δmax, J
(2)(δV )
)
− o(1) = min
(
δmax, 1− 4
√
1− δV
)
− o(1) (1)
and the equation above summarizes the previous state of affairs on this matter.
Our first result is an improvement of Equation (1) to the “one-and-a-half-Johnson”
function J (1.5)(x) = 1 − (1 − x)1/3. Lemma 1 says that for codes V of relative Hamming
distance δV ,
E[δx] ≥ min
(
δmax, J
(1.5)(δV )
)
− o(1) = min
(
δmax, 1− 3
√
1− δV
)
− o(1). (2)
Our second result shows that Equation (2) is tight, even for the special case of V being
an RS code. We find this result somewhat surprising because the J (1.5)(x) function is not
known to be related to any meaningful coding theoretic notion. The counter-example showing
the tightness of Equation (2) arises for very special cases, in which (i) F is a binary field
(of characteristic 2), (ii) the rate ρ is precisely 1/8 = 2−3 and, most importantly, (iii) the
evaluation domain D equals all of F.Roughly speaking, the counter-example uses functions
u∗, u : F2n → F2n that are 3/4 = 1 − ρ2/3-far from polynomials of degree ρ2n yet pretend
to be low-degree because for all x ∈ F2n \ {0} the function u∗ + xu is 1/2 = 3√ρ-close to a
polynomial of degree ρ2n. See Lemma 22 for details.
Our next set of results, which we discuss below, show how to go beyond the above
limitation through a new interactive proximity proving technique.
1.2 Domain Extension for Eliminating Pretenders (DEEP)
The case that interests us most is when V is an RS code (although we will return to the
discussion of general linear codes later). Henceforth, the RS code of rate ρ evaluated over D is
RS[F, D, ρ] := {f : D → F | deg(f) < ρ|D|} .
RS codes are maximum distance separable (MDS), meaning that δV = 1 − ρ and so
Equation (2) simplifies to
E[δx] ≥ min(δmax, 1− 3√ρ)− o(1). (3)
1 The generalization of our results to spaces U of dimension > 1 is straightforward by partitioning U into
lines through u∗ and applying these results to each line.
ITCS 2020
5:4 DEEP-FRI: Sampling Outside the Box Improves Soundness
This improved bound can be translated, using some extra work, to FRI soundness analysis
with similar guarantees. Specifically, Equation (3) implies that for f : D → F that is δ-far
from RS[F, D, ρ], the soundness error of a single invocation of the FRI QUERY test (which
requires log |D| queries) is at most max{1−δ, 3√ρ}, and this can be plugged into ZK-STARKs
like [2] and ZK-SNARGs like Aurora [5]. Roughly speaking, if the rejection probability is of
δ-far words is max(δ, δ0) then to reach soundness error less than 2−λ for codes of blocklength
n, communication complexity (and verifier complexity) scale roughly like λlog δ0 · c · logn for
some constant c. Thus, the improvement from Equation (1) to Equation (2) translates to a
25% reduction in verifier complexity (from 4λlog ρ · c · logn to 3λlog ρ · c · logn).
To break the soundness bound of Equation (2) and thereby further reduce verifier
complexity in the afore-mentioned systems, we suggest a new method. We discuss it first
for RS codes, then generalize to arbitrary linear codes. If u∗, u : D → F are indeed the
evaluation of two degree d polynomials, say, P ∗ and P , our verifier will artificially extend the
domain D to a larger one D¯, sample uniformly z ∈ D¯ and ask for the evaluation of P ∗(z)
and P (z). The answers provided by the prover can now be applied to modify each of u∗ and
u in a local manner to reflect the new knowledge, and along the way also prune down the
large list of polynomials which u∗ and u might pretend to be. If α∗z = P ∗(z), αz = P (z) are
the honest prover’s answers to the query z, then (X − z) divides P ∗(X)− α∗z and likewise
(X − z)|P (X) − αz. Letting αx = α∗ + xα and Px(X) = P ∗(X) + xP (X) it follows that
(X − z)|Px(X) − αx. Consider now the soundness of this procedure. In the extreme case
that u∗ has a small list of polynomials that, each, somewhat agree with it, then with high
probability over z, any answer provided by the prover will agree with at most one of the
polynomials in this list. The proof of our main technical result, Theorem 3, formalizes this
intuition. For radius δ, let L∗δ be the maximal list size,
L∗δ = max
u∗∈FD
| {v ∈ V | ∆(u∗, v) < δ} |
where ∆ denotes relative Hamming distance. Let V |ux(z)=αx be the restriction of V to
codewords that are evaluations of polynomials of degree at most d that, additionally, evaluate
to αx on z. Our main Theorem 3 shows that if ∆(u∗, V ) = δmax then for any pair of answers
α∗z, αz given in response to query z,
Ez,x
[
∆(ux, V |ux(z)=αx)
] ≥ δmax − L∗δ · (ρ|D||D¯|
)1/3
− o(1). (4)
The Johnson bound (Theorem 20) says that when δ < J(1 − ρ) = 1 − √ρ we have
L∗δ = O(1) and this improves the worst-case-to-average-case result from that of Equation (2)
to a bound that matches the Johnson bound:
Ez,x[∆(ux, V |ux(z)=αx)|] ≥ min (δmax, J(δV ))− o(1) = min (δmax,
√
ρ)− o(1). (5)
The exact behavior of the list size of Reed-Solomon codes beyond the Johnson bound is a
famous open problem. It may be the case that the list size is small for radii far greater than
the Johnson bound; in fact, for most domains D this is roughly known to hold [21]. If it
holds that that list sizes are small all the way up to radius equal to the distance δV = 1− ρ
(i.e., if Reed-Solomon codes meet list-decoding capacity), then Equation (5) implies that the
technique suggested here has optimal soundness for (nearly) all distance parameters.
1.3 DEEP-FRI as an application of domain extended sampling
Applying the technique of domain extension for eliminating pretenders to the FRI protocol
requires a modification that we discuss next, after recalling that protocol.
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Fast RS IOPP (FRI)
The FRI protocol can be described as a process of “randomly folding” an inverse Fast
Fourier Transform (iFFT). The classical iFFT receives as input a function f : 〈ω〉 → F
where ω generates a multiplicative group of order 2k for integer k. The iFFT computes (in
arithmetic complexity O(k2k)) the interpolating polynomial f˜(X) of the function f . This
computation follows by computing (in linear time) a pair of functions f0, f1 : 〈ω2〉 → F,
recalling |〈ω2〉| = 12 |〈ω〉|. Their interpolants f˜0, f˜1 are then used to compute in linear time
the original interpolant f˜ of f .
The FRI protocol is an IOPP, which means that a prover interacts with a verifier by
submitting oracles in response to randomness received by the verifier (as explained earlier
in this section). The prover’s goal in the FRI protocol is to convince the verifier that the
function f , to which the verifier has oracle access, is a member of the RS code evaluated
over 〈ω〉 and of rate ρ. Thus, the protocol starts with the prover committing to f as above.
The verifier now samples a random x(0) ∈ F and sends it to the prover, completing the first
round of interaction. In the second round, the prover commits to a function f (1) : 〈ω2〉 → F
that is supposedly the x(0)-linear combination of f0, f1 used in the iFFT above; namely, f (1)
should be equal to f0 + x(0)f1. It turns out that if f is indeed of degree less than ρ|〈ω〉| then
for all x(0) sampled by the verifier, the second function f (1) is of degree less than ρ|〈ω2〉| as
well. The tricky part is showing that when f is δ-far from RS[F, 〈ω〉, ρ] this also holds with
high probability (over x) for f (1) and some δ′ that is as close as possible to δ. (One can
show that invariably we have δ′ ≤ δ, i.e., the green line of Figure 1 is an upper bound on
soundness of both FRI and the new DEEP-FRI protocol described below.)
The worst-case-to-average-case results of Equation (2) and Lemma 1 can be converted
to similar improvements for FRI, showing that for δ < 1− 3√ρ we have δ′ ≈ δ. This follows
directly from the techniques of [9, Section 7] (see the red line in Figure 1). But to use the
new DEEP technique of Equation (4) and Theorem 3 in order to improve soundness of
an RS-IOPP, we need to modify the FRI protocol, leading to a new protocol that is aptly
called DEEP-FRI. Instead of constructing f (1) directly, our verifier first samples z(0) ∈ F
and queries the prover for the evaluation of the interpolant of f (0) on z(0) and −z(0). After
the answers αz(i) , α−z(i) have been recorded, the verifier proceeds by sampling x(0) and
expects the prover to submit f (1), which is the linear combination of f ′0, f ′1 derived from the
modification f ′ of f that takes into account the answers αz(i) , α−z(i) . Assuming f˜ is the
interpolant of f , an honest prover would set f ′(X) := (f˜(X)− U(X))/(Z(X)) where U(X)
is the degree ≤ 1 polynomial that evaluates to αz(0) on z(0) and to α−z(0) on −z(0) and Z(X)
is the monic degree 2 polynomial whose roots are z(0) and −z(0). As shown in Section 4,
the soundness bounds of Equation (4) and Theorem 3 now apply to DEEP-FRI. This shows
that the soundness of DEEP-FRI, i.e., the rejection probability of words that are δ-far from
RS[F, D, ρ]) is roughly δ for any δ that is smaller than the maximal radius for which list-sizes
are “small”. Figure 1 summarizes the results described here.
Practical Implications to reducing RPT query complexity
A number of recent implementations of zero knowledge (ZK) argument systems rely on
RPT protocols [1, 2, 5]. These systems are notable for their (i) lack of reliance on number
theoretic cryptographic assumptions (like hardness of the discrete log problem) and their
(ii) transparency – all verifier messages are public random coins (so-called Arthur-Merlin
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protocols)2. The FRI and DEEP-FRI protocols are efficient RPT solutions and, in fact, the
FRI protocol is already deployed in code in the Github repositories libSTARK and libIOP.
To construct a ZK system with sufficiently small soundness error, smaller than 2−λ, one
needs to bound the soundness error of the RPT used in it. Viewed from this angle, the
previous analysis of FRI by [9] proved that λρ4 queries to the FRI protocol suffice to reduce
soundness error below 2−λ. Lemma 2 lowers this number to λρ3 for FRI. Theorem 8 shows
that a number λρ2 of queries for the same target soundness is enough for DEEP-FRI, and
assuming Conjecture 21 the number of queries reduces to λρ, which is optimal as it matches
the soundness error upper bound for FRI and DEEP-FRI.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ
δ 0
upper bound & conjectured lower bound (Conjecture 21)
DEEP-FRI lower bound (Theorem 8)
FRI lower bound based on Lemma 2
FRI previous lower bound [9]
FRI initial lower bound [3]
Figure 1 FRI and DEEP-FRI soundness threshold δ0 as a function of RS code rate ρ, for a single
invocation of the QUERY phase, as field size q → ∞. δ0(ρ) is defined to be the largest distance
parameter δ for which soundness (rejection probaiblity) of a single invocation of the FRI/DEEP-FRI
QUERY is δ − o(1). Higher lines are better. The top line is the trivial upper bound on soundness
which applies to both FRI and DEEP-FRI; the bottom line is the soundness of the original analysis
of [3]. Dashed lines represent prior results. The red line is the (tight) soundness lower bound for
FRI and the blue line is a lower bound on DEEP-FRI soundness. Under a plausible conjecture for
Reed-Solomon list-decodability (Conjecture 21), the actual soundness is as high as the green line.
Organization of the rest of the paper
Section 2 gives an improved worst-to-average case reductions for general spaces. Section 3
presents our main technical result, showing that the DEEP method improves worst-to-average
case reductions for RS codes up to the Johnson bound (provably) and perhaps even beyond.
Details of the two main applications of the DEEP method follow: the DEEP-FRI protocol in
Section 4 obtains better soundness than the state of the art FRI protocol, and the DEEP-ALI
protocol which improves soundness in ZK-STARK systems is explained in Section 5.
2 Improved High-error Distance Preservation
Our first result gives better distance preservation results for linear codes V of relative distance
λ. The previous state-of-the-art [9] said that when a 1-dimensional affine space U contains
some element u∗ that is δmax = ∆(u∗, V ) far from V , then
Eu∈U [∆(u, V )] ≥ min(δmax, 1− J (2)(λ))− o(1).
2 By contrast, the ZK-SNARK used, e.g., in the Zcash cryptocurrency, relies on a setup phase involving
non-transparent randomness (and revealing the random coins that are used to create the system would
compromise its security).
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The following lemma improves the average-case distance to
Eu∈U [∆(u, V )] ≥ min(δmax, 1− J (1.5)(λ))− o(1).
Later on, in Appendix B, we will show that this result is tight (for a sub-family of RS codes).
I Lemma 1 (One-and-half Johnson distance preservation). Let V ⊆ Fnq be a linear code
of distance λ = ∆(V ) , min {∆(v, v′) | v 6= v′, v, v′ ∈ V }. Let , δ > 0 with  < 1/3 and
δ < 1− (1− λ+ )1/3.
Suppose u∗ ∈ Fnq is such that ∆(u∗, V ) > δ + . Then for all u ∈ Fnq , there are at most
2/2 values of x ∈ Fq such that ∆(u∗ + xu, V ) < δ.
This result is the contra-positive statement of the following, more informative, version of
it, that we prove below.
I Lemma 2 (One-and-half Johnson distance preservation – positive form). Let V ⊆ FDq be a
linear code of distance λ = ∆(V ). Let , δ > 0 with  < 1/3 and δ < 1− (1− λ+ )1/3. Let
u, u∗ ∈ FDq satisfy
Pr
x∈Fq
[∆(u∗ + xu, V ) < δ] ≥ 2
2q
. (6)
Then there exist v, v∗ ∈ V and C ⊆ D such that the following three statements hold simul-
taneously:
|C| ≥ (1− δ − )|D|,
u|C = v|C , and
u∗|C = v∗|C .
Observe that if u, u∗ satisfy Equation (6) then the v, v∗, C deduced by Lemma 2 have the
property that for all x ∈ Fq, we have ∆(u∗ + xu, v∗ + xv) ≤ δ + . In other words, the
existence of v, v∗ and C almost completely explains Equation (6).
Quantitatively weaker statements in this vein were proved by [16, 3] in the low-error case,
and by [12, 9] in the high-error case. The proofs of the latter two results used combinatorial
tools (the Kőváry-Sós-Turán bound and the Johnson bound respectively) that are closely
related to one another. Our improved proof below is direct, and is based on the same
convexity principle that underlies both the Kőváry-Sós-Turán and Johnson bounds.
Proof. Let ux = u∗ + xu. Let A = {x | ∆(u∗ + xu, V ) < δ}. For each x ∈ A, let vx ∈ V be
an element of V that is closest to ux, and let Sx ⊆ D be the agreement set of ux and vx,
defined as Sx = {y ∈ D | ux(y) = vx(y)}.
For x, β, γ picked uniformly from A and y picked uniformly from D, we have:
Ex,β,γ [|Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ |/|D|] = Ey,x,β,γ [1y∈Sx∩Sβ∩Sγ ] = Ey[Ex[1y∈Sx ]3]
≥ Ey,x[1y∈Sx ]3 ≥ (1− δ)3 > 1− λ+ .
The second equality above follows from the independence of the events y ∈ Sx, y ∈ Sβ , y ∈
Sγ given y ∈ D. The first inequality is Jensen’s and the last inequality is by assumption on
δ, λ, .
Thus Prx,β,γ [|Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ | ≥ (1− λ)|D|] ≥ . Note that
Pr
x,β,γ
[x, β, γ are not all distinct] < 3/|A|.
Since |A| ≥ 2/2 > 6 (recall  < 1/3), we have that 3/|A| ≤ /2 and hence x, β, γ are all
distinct with probability at least 1− /2. Thus with probability at least /2 over the choice
of x, β, γ, we have that x, β, γ are all distinct and |Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ | > (1− λ)|D|. This means
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that there are distinct x0, β0 such that Prγ [|Sx0 ∩ Sβ0 ∩ Sγ | > (1 − λ)|D|] ≥ /2. Fix a γ
where this happens. Let S = Sx0 ∩ Sβ0 ∩ Sγ . We have that (x0, ux0), (β0, uβ0), (γ, uγ) are
collinear. Thus (x0, ux0 |S), (β0, uβ0 |S), (γ, uγ |S) are all collinear. By definition of S, we get
that: (x0, vx0 |S), (β0, vβ0 |S), (γ, vγ |S) are all collinear. Since |S| > (1− λ)|D| (and recalling
that λ is the distance of V ), we get that vγ is determined by vγ |S via a linear map. This
means that (x0, vx0), (β0, vβ0), (γ, vγ) are all collinear.
Thus /2-fraction of the γ ∈ A have the “good” property that (γ, vγ) is on the line passing
through (x0, vx0) and (β0, vβ0). Write this line as v∗ + xv and notice that for all “good” γ
we have vγ = v∗ + γv. Let A′ ⊆ A denote the set of good elements for this line, recording
that |A′| ≥ |A| · /2 ≥ 1/.
Thus for x ∈ A′, ∆(u∗ + xu, v∗ + xv) < δ. Consider the set C ⊂ D that is defined by
C = {y ∈ D | u∗(y) = v∗(y) AND u(y) = v(y)} . For each y ∈ D \ C there exists at most a
single value of x ∈ Fq satisfying u∗(y) + x · u(y) = v∗(y) + x · v(y) because (u∗(y)− v∗(y)) +
x · (u(y)− v(y)) has at most one value x on which it vanishes.
This implies
δ ≥ Ex∈A′ [∆D(ux, vx)] ≥ |D \ C||D| ·
(
1− 1|A′|
)
≥
(
1− |C||D|
)
· (1− ) ≥ 1− |C||D| − .
Rearranging, we get |C||D| ≥ 1− (δ + ) and this completes the proof. J
3 The DEEP Theorem – Using Domain Extension for Eliminating
Pretenders (DEEP) and Improving Soundness
We now come to the statement of our improved-soundness distance preservation result. We
describe it first for the special case of RS codes. A weighted variant of the theorem is shown
in Appendix C.1 because it is used later in the DEEP-FRI protocol (Section 4). We end with
Appendix C.2 in which we present a general version of the folowing result, that applies to all
linear codes.
3.1 DEEP Theorem for RS codes
The vectors u∗, u discussed in the previous section are now viewed as functions u∗, u : D → Fq
and we are interested in the distance of a random linear combination ux = u∗ + x · u from
the code V = RS[Fq, D, ρ], where x ∈ Fq is sampled uniformly. Lemma 1 established that if
max(∆(u∗, V ),∆(u, V )) = δmax, then with high probability (over x), the function ux will
have distance at least ≈ min(δmax, 1− ρ1/3) from V .
Lemma 2 roughly gets used in the following way in the FRI protocol. There are two
functions u∗, u : D → Fq and there is a prover who claims that both are evaluations of
low degree polynomials. In order to verify this, the verifier uniformly samples x ∈ Fq and
considers the function ux = u∗ + x · u. Lemma 2 shows that if any of u∗, u is far from being
evaluations of a low degree polynomial, then so is u∗ + x · u. This then gets exploited in the
FRI protocol using FFT type ideas.
We now precede the random process of sampling x ∈ Fq with a step of domain extension,
explained next. Assume a prover claims that both u and u∗ are evaluations of low degree
polynomials (say P (Y ) and P ∗(Y )). So these polynomials can be evaluated also outside of D.
Based on this, a verifier first samples z ∈ Fq uniformly and asks the prover to reply with
two field elements a∗, a ∈ Fq which are supposedly equal to P ∗(z), P (z), respectively. After
receiving these answers, the verifier proceeds as before, sampling uniformly x ∈ Fq. Then,
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setting b = a∗ + x · a, we examine the distance of ux from the sub-code Vz,b ⊂ V comprised
of all members of V whose interpolating polynomial evaluates to b on input z. The code
Vz,b is the additive coset (shifted by b) of a low-degree ideal, the ideal generated by (X − z)
(cf. Lemma 6).
Using the Johnson Bound (Theorem 20) we prove that with high probability ux is at
least ≈ min(δmax, 1 − ρ1/2) far from Vz,b. Assuming RS codes have a larger list-decoding
radius (Conjecture 21), we show that with high probability ux is ≈ δmax-far from Vz,b for
nearly all values of δmax. Later, in Section 4, we shall use the improved distance preservation
to construct the DEEP-FRI protocol for testing proximity to the RS code with improved
soundness.
The statement we give below is given more generally in terms of the list size bound
L(Fq, D, d = ρ|D|, δ); we instantiate it later with the Johnson bound and with Conjecture 21.
It is useful to keep in mind that this will be used in a setting where q is much larger than
|D| (and hence d), and where L∗δ is small.
I Theorem 3 (DEEP method for RS codes). Let ρ > 0 and let V = RS[Fq, D, ρ]. For z, b ∈ Fq,
we let
Vz,b = {Q(Y )|D ∈ V | Q(z) = b} .
For δ > 0 let L∗δ = L(Fq, D, d = ρ|D|, δ).
Let u, u∗ ∈ FDq . For each z ∈ Fq, let Bz(X) ∈ Fq[X] be an arbitrary linear function.
Suppose that for some 1/3 >  > 0 the following holds,
Pr
x,z∈Fq
[∆(u∗ + xu, Vz,Bz(x)) < δ] ≥ max
(
2L∗δ
(
d
q
+ 
)1/3
,
4
2q
)
. (7)
Then there exist v, v∗ ∈ V and C ⊂ D such that: (i) |C| ≥ (1 − δ − )|D|, (ii) u|C = v|C ,
and (iii) u∗|C = v∗|C . Consequently, we have ∆(u, V ),∆(u∗, V ) ≤ δ + .
Proof. To simplify notation set η = max
(
2L∗δ
(
d
q + 
)1/3
, 42q
)
, and let ux = u∗ + xu.
Let E [x, z] denote the event “∃P (Y ) ∈ List(ux, V, δ), P (z) = Bz(x)”. The assumption of
Equation (7) now reads as Prx,z∈Fq [E [x, z]] ≥ η. Thus we get, Prx[Prz[E [x, z]] ≥ η/2] ≥ η/2.
Let A = {x ∈ Fq | Prz[E [x, z]] ≥ η/2]} and notice |A| ≥ ηq/2.
For x ∈ Fq, pick Px ∈ V to be a member P ∈ List(ux, V, δ) that maximizes
Pr
z∈Fq
[P (z) = Bz(x)].
Let Sx = {z ∈ Fq | Px(z) = Bz(x)} and set µx = |Sx|/q. By definition, |List(ux, V, δ)| ≤ L∗δ ,
and so by the pigeonhole principle, for each x ∈ A we have µx ≥ η2L∗
δ
.
For x, β, γ picked uniformly from A, and z picked uniformly from Fq, we have:
Ex,β,γ [|Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ |/q] = Ez,x,β,γ [1z∈Sx∩Sβ∩Sγ ] = Ez[Ex[1z∈Sx ]3]
≥ Ez,x[1z∈Sx ]3 ≥
(
η
2L∗δ
)3
>
d
q
+ .
The second equality above follows from the independence of x, β, γ. The first inequality
is an application of Jensen’s inequality and the last inequality is by assumption on η. Thus
Prx,β,γ [|Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ | > d] ≥ . Note that Prx,β,γ [x, β, γ are not all distinct] < 3/|A|. Since
|A| ≥ ηq/2 ≥ 2/2 ≥ 6/ we have 3/|A| ≤ /2. Thus Prx,β,γ [x, β, γ are all distinct and |Sx ∩
Sβ ∩ Sγ | > d] ≥ /2.
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This means that there are distinct x0, β0 such that Prγ [|Sx0 ∩ Sβ0 ∩ Sγ | > d] ≥ /2.
Consider some γ where this happens. Let S = Sx0 ∩Sβ0 ∩Sγ . By construction we know that
for all z ∈ Fq, (x0, Bz(x0)), (β0, Bz(β0)), (γ,Bz(γ)) are collinear. So, in particular, for z ∈ S
this holds.
By definition of S, we get that for each z ∈ S, (x0, Px0(z)), (β0, Pβ0(z)), (γ, Pγ(z)) ∈
Fq × Fq are collinear. Since |S| > d, we have that Pγ is uniquely determined by Pγ |S by
a linear map. This allows us to conclude that (x0, Px0), (β0, Pβ0), (γ, Pγ) ∈ Fq × Fq[Y ] are
collinear in the Fq-vector space Fq × Fq[Y ].
Thus, an /2-fraction of the γ ∈ A have the “good” property that (γ, Pγ) is on the line
passing through (x0, Px0) and (β0, Pβ0). Write this line as {P ∗ + xP | x ∈ F} and notice that
for all “good” γ we have Pγ = P ∗ + γP . Let A′ ⊆ A denote the set of good elements for this
line, recording that |A′| ≥ |A| · /2 ≥ 1/. By definition of List(ux, V, δ) and the assumption
Px ∈ List(ux, V, δ), we have that ∆(ux, Px) < δ for x ∈ A′.
Consider the set C ⊂ D defined by C = {y ∈ D | u∗(y) = P ∗(y) AND u(y) = P (y)} . For
each y ∈ D \C there exists at most a single value of x ∈ Fq satisfying ux(y) = Px(y) because
ux(y) − Px(y) = (u∗(y) − P ∗(y)) + x · (u(y) − P (y)) has at most one value x on which it
vanishes. This implies
δ ≥ max
x∈A′
{∆D(ux, Px)} ≥ |D \ C||D| ·
(
1− 1|A′|
)
≥
(
1− |C||D|
)
· (1− ) ≥ 1− |C||D| − .
Rearranging, we get |C||D| ≥ 1− (δ + ). Taking v = P and v∗ = P ∗ completes the proof. J
4 First Application – DEEP-FRI
In this section we describe the new fast RS IOPP, called DEEP-FRI. We start by recalling
the FRI protocol from [3], describing it nearly verbatim as in [10, Section 7].
4.1 FRI
Our starting point is a function f (0) : L(0) → F where F is a finite field, the evaluation
domain L(0) ⊂ F is a coset of a group3 contained in F, and |L(0)| = 2k(0) . We assume the
target rate is ρ = 2−R for some positive integer R. The FRI protocol is a two-phase protocol
(the two phases are called COMMIT and QUERY) that convinces a verifier that f (0) is close
to the Reed-Solomon code RS[F, L(0), ρ].
The COMMIT phase of the FRI protocol involves r = k(0) − R rounds. Before any
communication, the prover and verifier agree on a sequence of (cosets of) sub-groups L(i),
where |L(i)| = 2k(0)−i. Let RS(i) denote the Reed-Solomon code RS[F, L(i), ρ|L(i)|].
The main ingredient of the FRI protocol is a special algebraic hash function Hx, which
takes a seed x ∈ F, and given as input a function f : L(i) → F, it produces as output a hash
whose length is 1/2 as long as f . More concretely, Hx[f ] is a function
Hx[f ] : L(i+1) → F
with the following properties:
1. locality: For any s ∈ L(i+1), Hx[f ](s) can be computed by querying f at just two points
in its domain (these two points are (q(i))−1(s)).
3 The group can be additive, in which case F is a binary field, or multiplicative, in which case it is not.
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2. completeness: If f ∈ RS(i), then for all x ∈ F, we have that Hx[f ] ∈ RS(i+1).
3. soundness: If f is far from RS(i), then with high probability over the choice of seed x,
Hx[f ] is quite far from RS(i+1).
These last two properties roughly show that for random x, Hx preserves distance to Reed-
Solomon codes. For the precise description of Hx see Appendix E and [9].
The high-level idea of the FRI protocol can then be described as follows. First we are in
the COMMIT phase of the protocol. The verifier picks a random x(0) ∈ F and asks the prover
to write down the hash Hx(0) [f (0)] : L(1) → F. By Properties 2 and 3 above, our original
problem of estimating the distance of f (0) to RS(0) reduces to estimating the distance of
Hx(0) [f (0)] to RS(1) (which is a problem of 1/2 the size). This process is then repeated: the
verifier picks a random x(1) ∈ F and asks the prover to write down Hx(1) [Hx(0) [f (0)]], and so
on. After r rounds of this, we are reduced to a constant sized problem which can be solved
in a trivial manner. However, the verifier cannot blindly trust that the functions f (1), . . .
that were written down by the prover truly are obtained by repeatedly hashing f (0). This
has to be checked, and the verifier does this in the QUERY phase of the protocol, using
Property 1 above.
We describe the phases of the protocol below.
COMMIT Phase:
1. For i = 0 to r − 1:
a. The verifier picks uniformly random x(i) ∈ F and sends it to the prover.
b. The prover writes down a function f (i+1) : L(i+1) → F. (In the case of an honest
prover, f (i+1) = Hx(i) [f (i)].)
2. The prover writes down a value C ∈ Fq. (In the case of an honest prover, f (r) is the
constant function with value = C).
QUERY Phase: (executed by the Verifier)
1. Repeat ` times:
a. Pick s(0) ∈ L(0) uniformly at random.
b. For i = 0 to r − 1:
i. Define s(i+1) ∈ L(i+1) by s(i+1) = q(i)(s(i)).
ii. Compute Hx(i) [f (i)](s(i+1)) by making 2 queries to f (i).
iii. If f (i+1)(s(i+1)) 6= Hx(i) [f (i)](s(i+1)), then REJECT.
c. If f (r)(s(r)) 6= C, then REJECT.
2. ACCEPT
The previous state of the art regarding the soundness of FRI is given by the following
statement from [9]. In what follows let J(x) = 1−
√
1− x(1− ).
I Theorem 4 (FRI soundness (informal)). Suppose δ(0) , ∆(f (0),RS(0)) > 0. Let n = |L(0)|.
Then for any  > 0 there exists ′ > 0 so that with probability at least
1− 2 logn
3|F| (8)
over the randomness of the verifier during the COMMIT phase, and for any (adaptively
chosen) prover oracles f (1), . . . , f (r), the QUERY protocol with repetition parameter ` outputs
accept with probability at most(
1−min
{
δ(0), 1− (ρ1/4 + ′)
}
+  logn
)`
. (9)
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I Remark 5. Using the improved distance preservation of Lemma 2 in the analysis of FRI
from [9], one immediately improves the factor 1/4 in the exponent in Equation (11) to an
exponent of 1/3 (details omitted).
4.2 DEEP-FRI
We now describe our variation of FRI, that we call DEEP-FRI, for which we can give improved
soundness guarantees, at the cost of a small increase in the query complexity (but no increase
in the proof length or the number of queries to committed proofs – which is important in
applications).
Before we can describe our protocol we introduce the operation of “quotienting”, which
allows us to focus our attention on polynomials taking certain values at certain points.
4.2.1 Quotienting
Suppose we a set L ⊆ Fq and a function f : L→ Fq. Suppose further that we are given a
point z ∈ Fq and a value b ∈ Fq.
We define the function QUOTIENT(f, z, b) : L→ Fq as follows. Let Z(Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] be the
polynomial Z(Y ) = Y − z. Then we define QUOTIENT(f, z, b) to be the function g : L→ Fq
given by:
g(y) = f(y)− b
Z(y)
(or more succinctly, g = f−b)Z ).
I Lemma 6. Let L ⊆ Fq. Let z ∈ Fq with z 6∈ L. Let d ≥ 1 be an integer.
Let f : L → Fq, and b ∈ Fq. Let g = QUOTIENT(f, z, b). Then the following are
equivalent:
There exists a polynomial Q(X) ∈ Fq[X] of degree at most d− 1 such that ∆(g,Q) < δ.
There exists a polynomial R(X) ∈ Fq[X] of degree at most d such that ∆(f,R) < δ and
R(z) = b.
Proof. If there is such a polynomial Q,deg(Q) ≤ d − 1 that agrees with g on all but a
δ-fraction of entries, we can take R = QZ + b. Notice deg(R) ≤ d because deg(Z) = 1.
Conversely, if there is such a polynomial R that agrees with f on all but a δ-fraction of
entries, we can take Q = (R− b)/Z. This is indeed a polynomial because R− b vanishes on
z, so Z|(R− b) in the ring of polynomials.
Finally, by construction R agrees with f whenever g agrees with R and this completes
the proof. J
4.3 DEEP-FRI
Recall: We have linear spaces L(0), L(1), . . . , L(r), with dimensions k, k − 1, . . . , k − r. We
further have 1 dimensional subspaces L(0)0 , L
(1)
0 , . . . , L
(r)
0 with L
(i)
0 ⊆ L(i).
For this, it will be helpful to keep in mind the case that the domain L(0) is much smaller
than the field Fq (maybe q = |L(0)|Θ(1)).
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I Protocol 7 (DEEP-FRI).
Input: a function f (0) : L(0) → Fq which is supposed to be of degree < d(0).
COMMIT Phase:
1. For each i ∈ [0, r − 1]:
a. The verifier picks a uniformly random z(i) ∈ Fq.
b. The prover writes down a degree one polynomial B(i)
z(i)
(X) ∈ Fq[X] (which is
supposed to be such that B(i)
z(i)
(x) equals the evaluation of the low degree polynomial
Hx[f (i)] at z(i)).
c. The verifier picks uniformly random x(i) ∈ Fq.
d. The prover writes down a function
f (i+1) : L(i+1) → Fq.
(which on input y is supposed to equal QUOTIENT(Hx(i) [f (i)], z(i), B
(i)
z(i)
(x)).)
2. The prover writes down a value C ∈ Fq.
QUERY Phase:
1. Repeat ` times:
a. The verifier picks a uniformly random s(0) ∈ D.
b. For each i ∈ [0, r − 1]:
i. Define s(i+1) ∈ L(i+1) by s(i+1) = q(i)(s(i)).
ii. Compute Hx(i) [f (i)](s(i+1)) by making 2 queries to f (i).
iii. If Hx(i) [f (i)](s(i+1)) 6= f (i+1)(s(i+1)) · (s(i+1) − z(i)) +B(i)z(i)(x(i)), then REJECT.
c. If f (r)(s(r)) 6= C, then REJECT.
2. ACCEPT.
4.4 Analysis
The following theorem proves the soundness of the DEEP-FRI protocol.
I Theorem 8 (DEEP-FRI). Fix degree bound d(0) = 3 · 2r − 2 and RS(0) = RS[Fq, L(0), d(0)].
Let n = |L(0)|.
For some , δ > 0, let
δ∗ = δ − 2r,
L∗ = L(Fq, L(0), d(0), δ∗),
ν∗ = 2L∗
(
d(0)
q
+ 
)1/3
+ 4
2q
.
Then the following properties hold when the DEEP-FRI protocol is invoked on oracle
f (0) : L(0) → Fq,
1. Prover complexity is O(n) arithmetic operations over F
2. Verifier complexity is O(logn) arithmetic operations over F for a single invocation of
the QUERY phase; this also bounds communication and query complexity (measured in
field elements).
3. Completeness If f (0) ∈ RS(0) and f (1), . . . , f (r) are computed by the prover specified in
the COMMIT phase, then the DEEP-FRI verifier outputs accept with probability 1.
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4. Soundness Suppose ∆(f (0),RS(0)) > δ. Then with all but probability
errCOMMIT ≤ r · ν∗ ≤ (logn) · ν∗. (10)
and for any (adaptively chosen) prover oracles f (1), . . . , f (r), the QUERY protocol with
repetition parameter ` outputs accept with probability at most
errQUERY ≤ (1− δ∗ + (logn) · )` (11)
Consequently, the soundness error of FRI is at most
err (δ) ≤ (logn) · ν∗ + (1− δ∗ + (logn) · )` (12)
We give a consequence below with a specific setting of parameters based on the Johnson
bound.
I Example 9. Continuing with the notation of Theorem 8, fix degree bound d(0) = 3 · 2r − 2
and assume n = |L(0)| < √q. Let RS(0) = RS[Fq, L(0), d(0)] and let ρ = d(0)/n be its rate.
Let f (0) : L(0) → Fq be a function, and let δ(0) = ∆(f (0), RS(0)). Then with all but
probability errCOMMIT ≤ O(q−Ω(1)), the query phase will accept with probability at most:
errQUERY ≤ (max(1− δ(0),√ρ) + o(1))` as n→∞.
Proof. Note that d(0) ≤ n ≤ √q.
Set δ = min(δ(0), 1−√ρ− q−1/13), and apply the previous theorem. Theorem 20 implies
that L∗ < q1/13/(2√ρ) = O(q1/13). Set  = q−6/13. Hence
ν∗ = 2L∗
(
d(0)q−1 + q−6/13
)1/3
+ 4q−6/13 = O(q−1/13),
which implies errCOMMIT ≤ O˜(q−1/13).
If δ = δ(0), then 1− δ∗ + (logn) = 1− δ + o(1). Otherwise δ = 1−√ρ− q−1/13, and so
1− δ∗ + (logn) = √ρ+ q−1/13 + (logn) = √ρ+ q−1/13 + (logn)q−6/13.
Thus errQUERY ≤ (max(1− δ,√ρ) + o(1))`. J
We now give an example setting of DEEP-FRI under the optimistic Conjecture 21.
I Example 10. Assume Conjecture 21. Continuing with the notation of Theorem 8, fix
degree bound d(0) = 3 ·2r−2 and n = |L(0)|. Let RS(0) = RS[Fq, L(0), d(0)] and let ρ = d(0)/n
be its rate.
Let C = Cρ be the constant given by Conjecture 21. Suppose q > n24C .
Let f (0) : L(0) → Fq be a function, and let δ(0) = ∆(f (0), RS(0)). Then with all but
probability errCOMMIT ≤ O(q−Ω(1)), the query phase will accept with probability at most:
errQUERY ≤ (1− δ(0) + o(1))` as n→∞.
Proof. Set  = q−1/(6C).
Set δ = min(δ(0), 1− ρ− q−1/(6C)). Conjecture 21 gives us:
L∗ < nCq1/6.
We then apply the previous theorem. We get ν∗  O(L∗ · (d/q + )1/3 + 12q ) q−1/12,
and this gives us the claimed bound on errCOMMIT.
For the bound on errQUERY, we note that δ = δ(0) + o(1). This is because every function
is within distance 1− ρ of RS(0) (this follows easily from polynomial interpolation). Thus
1− δ∗ + (logn) = δ + o(1),
and we get the desired bound on errCOMMIT. J
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Verifier complexity and completeness follow by construction (see, e.g., [3] for detailed
analysis of these aspects). We start by analyzing prover time and showing it is linear. In the
rest of the section we prove the soundness bound of Theorem 8.
4.5 Prover complexity
The prover is involved in two sub-steps of the COMMIT phase, Items 1b and 1d. Inspection
reveals that Item 1d requires O(|L(i)|) arithmetic operations. In what follows we show that
Item 1b can also be computed in similar asymptotic complexity. To show this it suffices to
prove the following claim.
B Claim 11 (Fast DEEP evaluation). Let f : L→ F be a function and L be a group (additive
or multiplicative) of size 2k for integer k. Let Pf (X) be the interpolant of f as defined
in Appendix A. There exists an algorithm that, given z ∈ F, computes Pf (z) using O(|L|)
arithmetic operations.
Proof. We compute within O(|L|) arithmetic operations a pair (f ′, z′) satisfying
f ′ : L′ → F where L′ is a group of size 2k−1.
z′ ∈ F.
Pf (z) = Pf ′(z′) where Pf ′ is the interpolant of f ′.
This suffices to solve the problem by induction, noticing the total sum of arithmetic operations
is a geometric sum (the base case, in which |L| = O(1), is trvially solvable using O(1)
arithmetic operations).
To construct f ′ let L0 be a subgroup of L of size 2. The quadratic polynomial q(X)
whose roots are L0 induces a 2-to-1 map on L. Let L′ = {q(x) | x ∈ L} be the image of this
map on L and notice that L′ is a group of size |L|/2, and for each y ∈ L′ there exists a
unique pair, denoted xy, x′y ∈ L, such that y = q(xy) = q(x′y). Furthermore, there exists a
unique bivariate polynomial Qf (X,Y ) satisfying:
degX(Qf ) ≤ 1
degY (Qf ) ≤ deg(Pf )/2
Pf (X) = Qf (X, q(X)) mod Y − q(X)
See [3, Claim 4.2] for a proof. We define z′ = q(z) and for y ∈ L′ define f ′(y) = Qf (z, y).
By the third item above we have f ′(z′) = Qf (z, z′) = Qf (z, q(z)) = Pf (z). The second
item above shows that Pf ′(Y ) is the interpolant of f ′ because deg(Pf ′) < |L′| and both f ′
and Pf ′ agree on all of L′. This implies Pf ′(z′) = f ′(z′) which we showed equals Pf (z), so
Pf (z) = Pf ′(z′) as required. All that is left is to argue that f ′ can be computed from f using
O(|L|) arithmetic operations. This follows from the first bullet because each entry f ′(y) can
be computed from f(xy) and f(x′y) by interpolating the degree-1 polynomial Qf (X, y) and
evaluating it at z to obtain Qf (z, y) = f ′(y). This completes the proof. C
4.6 Preparations
We do the analysis below for the case ` = 1. The generalization to arbitrary ` easily follows.
Define d(0) = 3 · 2r − 2, and d(i+1) = d(i)/2− 1. It is easy to check that d(r) = 1. Define
RS(i) = RS[Fq, L(i), d(i)]. In the case of the honest prover (when f (0) ∈ RS(0)), we will have
f (i) ∈ RS(i) for all i.
Our analysis of the above protocol will track the agreement of f (i) with RS(i). This
agreement will be measured in a certain weighted way, which we define next.
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4.6.1 The success probability at s ∈ L(i)
There is a natural directed forest that one can draw on the vertex set
L(0) ∪ L(1) ∪ . . . ∪ L(r),
namely, where s ∈ L(i) is joined to q(i)(s) ∈ L(i+1) (and we say that s is a child of q(i)(s)).
Note that every vertex not in L(0) has two children.
Let i ≤ r − 1 and s0 ∈ L(i). Let s ∈ L(i+1) be the parent of s0, and let s1 ∈ L(i) the
sibling of s0. We color s0 GREEN if f (i+1)(s) is consistent with f (i) |{s0,s1} according to
the test
Hx(i) [f (i)](s) = f (i+1)(s) · (s− z(i)) +B(i)z(i)(x(i))
and we color s0 RED otherwise. Notice that a vertex and its sibling get the same color.
For s ∈ L(r), we color s GREEN if f (r)(s) = C and RED otherwise.
The QUERY phase of the protocol can be summarized as follows: we pick a uniformly
random s(0) ∈ L(0) and consider the path s(0), s(1), s(2) . . . , s(r) going through all its ancestors.
If all these vertices are GREEN, then we ACCEPT, otherwise we REJECT.
To capture this, we define functions η(i) : L(i) → R as follows. For s ∈ L(i), let η(i)(s)
be the fraction of leaf-descendants s(0) of s for which the path from s(0) to s (including
s(0) but not including s) consists exclusively of GREEN vertices. Observe that pACCEPT =
Es∈L(r) [η(r)(s) · 1f(r)(s)=C ] equals the probability that the QUERY phase accepts.
The exact quantity that we will track is as i increases is the weighted agreement:
α(i) = agreeη(i) [f (i),RS(i)].
Notice that
α(0) = 1−∆(f (0),RS(0)),
and the acceptance probability, pACCEPT satisfies:
pACCEPT ≤ α(r).
Our main intermediate claim is that with high probability over the choice of x(i), z(i), B(i)
z(i)
,
we have that α(i+1) is not much more than α(i). This gives us that pACCEPT is not much
more than 1−∆(f (0),RS(0)), as desired.
4.6.2 Operations AVG and ZERO
We define two important operations.
1. AVG. For a function w : L(i−1) → R, we define the function AVG[w] : L(i) → R as follows.
Let s ∈ L(i), and let {s0, s1} = (q(i−1))−1(s). Then define:
AVG[w](s) = w(s0) + w(s1)2 .
2. ZERO. For a function w : L(i) → R, and a set S ⊆ L(i), we define the function
ZERO[w, S] : L(i) → R as follows. For s ∈ L(i), we set:
ZERO[w, S](s) =
{
0 s ∈ S
w(s) s 6∈ S .
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We can use these two operations to express η(i+1) in terms of η(i). Let E(i+1) denote the
set of all s ∈ S(i+1) both of whose children are RED (i.e., the test
Hx(i) [f (i)](s) = f (i+1)(s) · (s− z(i)) +B(i)z(i)(x(i))
fails at s).
Define θ(i+1) : L(i+1) → R by
θ(i+1) = AVG[η(i)].
Then we have:
η(i+1) = ZERO(θ(i+1), E(i+1)).
Analogous to our definition of
α(i) = agreeη(i)(f (i),RS(i)),
we define
β(i+1) = agreeθ(i+1)(Hx(i) [f
(i)], {P (Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(P ) ≤ d(i+1) and P (z(i)) = B(i)
z(i)
(x(i))}).
The following two lemmas control the growth of α(i) and β(i).
I Lemma 12. For all i, with probability at least 1− ν∗ over the choice of x(i), z(i), we have:
β(i+1) ≤ max(α(i), 1− δ∗) + .
We prove this using Theorem 25 in Appendix F.
I Lemma 13. For all i,
α(i) ≤ β(i).
We prove this using Lemma 6 in Appendix F.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof. As observed earlier, α(0) = 1−∆(f (0),RS(0)) < 1− δ.
The two lemmas above imply that with probability at least 1− rν∗,
α(r) ≤ max(α(0), 1− δ∗) + r ·  < (1−min(δ, δ∗) + r · ).
Finally, we use the observation that pACCEPT ≤ α(r) to complete the proof. J
5 Second Application – The DEEP Algebraic Linking IOP (DEEP-ALI)
protocol
The techniques used earlier in Theorem 3 and Section 4 can also be used to improve soundness
in other parts of an interactive oracle proof (IOP) protocol. We apply them here to obtain a
Scalable Transparent IOP of Knowledge (STIK) [2, Definition 3.3] with better soundness
than the prior state of the art, given in [2, Theorem 3.4].
Proof systems typically use a few steps of reduction to convert problems of membership
in a nondeterministic language L to algebraic problems regarding proximity of a function
(or a sequence of functions) to an algebraic code like Reed-Solomon (or, in earlier works,
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Reed-Muller). The goal of such a reduction is to maintain a large proximity gap γ, meaning
that for instances in L, an honest prover will provide information that leads to codewords,
whereas for instances not in L, any oracles submitted by the prover will be converted by the
reduction, with high probability, to functions that are γ-far from the code. Considerable
effort is devoted to increasing γ because it is the input to the proximity protocols (like FRI
and DEEP-FRI) and the soundness of those protocols is correlated to γ (as discussed earlier,
e.g., in Theorem 8).
The STIK protocol is a special case of this paradigm. It requires the prover to provide
oracle access to a function f : D → F that is supposedly an RS encoding of a witness for
membership of the input instance in L. A set of t-local constraints is applied to f to construct
a function g : D → F, along with a gap-gurantee: If f is indeed an encoding of a valid witness
for the instance, then the resulting function g : D → F is also be a member of an RS code.
One of the tests that the verifier performs is a consistency test between f and g, and, prior
to this work, this consistency test was applied to the functions f and g directly. This leads
to a rather small gap γ ≤ 18 which results in a small soundness guarantee from the RPT
protocol applied to f, g later on.
In this section we apply the DEEP technique to this setting. After f and g have been
provided, the verifier samples a random z ∈ Fq and asks for the values of the interpolating
polynomials of f, g on all t entries needed to check the consistency test. Our verifier now
applies the QUOTIENT operation to f, g, using the information obtained from the prover.
Crucially, we prove that a single consistency test, conducted over a large domain D′ ⊃ D,
suffices to improve the proximity gap to roughly 1−√ρ, a value that approaches 1 as ρ→ 0.
Assuming Conjecture 21 the proximity gap is nearly-optimal, at γ ≈ 1− ρ (compare with
with the value γ ≤ 1/8 obtained by prior works). Details follow.
We focus on the the Algebraic linking IOP protocol (ALI) of [2, Theorem B.15], and
present a new protocol that we call DEEP-ALI (Protocol 17) that obtains the aforementioned
improved proximity gap(s).
In what follows, we will first recall (a variant of) the language (or, more accurately, binary
relation) which was the input to the ALI protocol of [2] and is likewise the input to our
DEEP-ALI protocol. The description of the protocol follows in Section 5.2. Its basic properties
are specified in Section 5.3 and we analyze its soundness in Theorem 15 and Section 5.4.
5.1 The Algebraic Placement and Routing (APR) Relation
In what follows we use the notation f˜ to refer to a polynomial in F[x]. Note that the operator
|D for D ⊆ F takes a polynomial to a function: f˜ |D: D → F.
We start by defining a simplified version of the Algebraic placement and routing relation
(APR). See [2, Definition B.10]. In particular, we only use one witness polynomial. This
relation will be the input to the reduction used in Protocol 17.
I Definition 14. The relation RAPR is the set of pairs (x,w) satisfying:
1. Instance format: The instance x is a tuple (Fq, d, C) where:
Fq is a finite field of size q.
d is an integer representing a bound on the degree of the witness.
C is a set of |C| tuples (M i, P i, Qi) representing constraints. M i is the mask which is
a sequence of field elements M i = {M ij ∈ Fq}|M
i|
j=1 . P i is the condition of the constraint
which is a polynomial with |M i| variables. Qi ∈ Fq[x] is the domain polynomial of the
constraint which should vanish on the locations where the constraint should hold.
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We further introduce the following notation:
LetM = {M ij | 1 ≤ i ≤ |C| and 1 ≤ j ≤ |M i|} ⊆ Fq be the full mask.
Let dC = maxi deg(P i) be the maximal total degree of the P is.
Let Qlcm ∈ Fq[x] be the least common multiple of the Qis.
2. Witness format: The witness w is a polynomial f˜ ∈ Fq[x]. A constraint (M,P,Q) is
said to hold at a location x ∈ Fq if P (f˜(x ·M1), . . . , f˜(x ·M|M |)) = 0. We say that f˜
satisfies the constraint if the constraint holds at every x ∈ Fq for which Q(x) = 0.
We say that w satisfies the instance if and only if deg(f˜) < d and f˜ satisfies all of the
constraints.
To see that the notion of the RAPR relation defined above is strong enough, we follow
the ideas from [2] and show a reduction from an Algebraic Intermediate Representation
(AIR, see [2, Definition B.3]) to an APR. The following uses the notation from [2, Definition
B.3]. Let x = (Fq, T,w,P, C,B) be an instance of RAIR. Pick a multiplicative subgroup
〈γ〉 ⊆ F×q of size T · w and pick f˜ such that f˜(γtw+j) = wj(t) for t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [w] (here
[n] = {0, . . . , n− 1}). For all the constraints in P, choose the mask M = {1, γ, . . . , γ2w−1}
and choose the domain polynomial whose zeros are {γtw}t∈[T−1] (Q(x) = (xT −1)/(x−γ−w)).
Replace each boundary constraint (i, j, α) ∈ B with a regular constraint with mask M = {1},
P (x) = x− α and Q(x) = x− γiw+j .
5.2 The DEEP-ALI protocol
We now describe our new protocol, that achieves improved soundness, as stated in the
following theorem.
I Theorem 15 (DEEP-ALI soundness). Fix a code rate 0 < ρ < 1 and a distance parameter
0 < δ ≤ 1 − ρ. Let D,D′ ⊆ Fq be two evaluation domains such that |D| = dρ−1 and
|D′| = d · dCρ−1. Let RPTD, RPTD′ be two IOPPs with perfect completeness for the codes
RS[Fq, D, (d− |M|)/|D|]) and RS[Fq, D′, (ddC − 1)/|D′|]) respectively. Let , ′ be the bounds
on the soundness error (acceptance probability) for words that are at least δ-far from the
corresponding code. Denote
L = max{L(Fq, D, d, δ),L(Fq, D′, d · dC , δ)}.
Then, there exists an IOP for RAPR with perfect completeness and soundness error + ′ +
2L2(d·dC+deg(Qlcm))
q .
I Example 16. Fix a code rate 0 < ρ < 1. Choosing DEEP-FRI as the RPT protocol and
setting δ = 1−√ρ− q−1/13 as in Example 9, using ` repetitions, we obtain an IOP for RAPR
with perfect completeness and soundness error that approaches 2ρ`/2 as q →∞ assuming
the parameters d, dC , deg(Qlcm) of the APR are constant with respect to q.
Proof. Theorem 20 implies that L ≤ q1/13/(2√ρ) = O(q1/13). Hence the expression 2L2(d ·
dC + deg(Qlcm))/q approaches 0 as q →∞. Moreover, Example 9 implies that , ′ approach
ρ`/2. J
We now describe the protocol that achieves the soundness of Theorem 15.
I Protocol 17 (DEEP-ALI).
1. The prover sends an oracle f : D → F (which should be f˜ |D).
2. The verifier sends random coefficients α = (α1, . . . , α|C|) ∈ F|C|q .
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3. The prover sends an oracle gα : D′ → F (which should be g˜α |D′ , where
g˜α(x) =
|C|∑
i=1
αi ·
P i(f˜(x ·M i1), . . . , f˜(x ·M i|Mi|))
Qi(x) . (13)
Note that deg(g˜α) < d · dC).
4. The verifier sends a random value z ∈ Fq.
5. DenoteMz = {z ·M ij | 1 ≤ i ≤ |C| and 1 ≤ j ≤ |M i|}. The prover sends aα,z :Mz → F
(which should be f˜ |Mz). The verifier deduces bα,z, the alleged value of g˜α(z), using
Equation (13).
6. Let U(x), Z(x) as defined in Section 4.2.1 for QUOTIENT(f, aα,z) and let
h1(x) = h1α,z(x) = QUOTIENT(f, aα,z) =
f(x)− U(x)
Z(x) ,
h2(x) = h2α,z(x) = QUOTIENT(gα, {z 7→ bα,z}) =
gα(x)− bα,z
x− z ,
and note that the verifier has oracle access to h1 and h2 using the oracles f and gα.
7. They use RPTD and RPTD′ to prove that h1 is at most δ-far from RS[Fq, D, (d−|M|)/|D|]
(in other words, it is close to a polynomial of degree < d− |M|) and that h2 is at most
δ-far from RS[Fq, D′, (ddC − 1)/|D′|].
5.3 Properties of DEEP-ALI
Note that in the original ALI protocol, the equivalent to the expression P i(f˜(x ·M i1), . . . , f˜(x ·
M i|Mi|))/Qi(x) is sampled at Q random locations from the evaluation domain, where Q is
the number of queries.
The main idea in DEEP-ALI is to use Quotienting to allow the verifier to choose one
random element z from the entire field, and check the consistency between f˜ and g˜ only at
x = z.
The fact that DEEP-ALI allows to sample from the entire field introduces several advantages
over the ALI protocol from [2]:
Soundness. As described above, the reduction in ALI has lower bound 1/8 on the distance
from the code for inputs that are not in the language, even for ρ→ 0. In DEEP-ALI the
lower bound on the distance is 1−√ρ.
Query complexity. In ALI the verifier queries |M| ·Q field elements as we need |M| elements
to evaluate P i(f˜(x ·M i1), . . . , f˜(x ·M i|Mi|)). In DEEP-ALI the verifier queries O(|M|+ Q)
field elements as the evaluation of P i is done once.
Verifier complexity. Previously, the verifier complexity was Ω(Q · Tarith) (where Tarith is
the arithmetic complexity of evaluating all the constraints). The verifier complexity in
DEEP-ALI depends on Q + Tarith as we evaluate the constraints only once.
Prover complexity. It is possible to alter Definition 14 and DEEP-ALI to work with several
witness polynomials f1, . . . , fw (as was done in ALI). The prover complexity in this case
will depend on (wρ−1 + dCρ−1 + TarithdC) · d instead of (wdCρ−1 + TarithdC) · d (in ALI).
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5.4 Soundness analysis
The proof of Theorem 15 will follow from the following lemma:
I Lemma 18. Let E be the event that the DEEP-ALI verifier accepts. If
Pr[E ] ≥ + ′ + 2L
2(d · dC + deg(Qlcm))
q
,
then there exists a polynomial of degree < d satisfying the constraints.
Proof. Let L(f) ⊆ RS[Fq, D, ρ] be the set of codewords that are at most δ-far from f .
Similarly define L(gα). We have |L(f)|, |L(gα)| ≤ L.
Let E1 be the event where the verifier accepts and h1 and h2 are at most δ-far from the
corresponding codes. Denote η = 2L2(d · dC + deg(Qlcm))/q. Then, Pr[E1] ≥ η. E1 implies
that there exists a polynomial h˜1 = h˜1α,z of degree < d− |M| such that
∣∣{x ∈ D : h˜1(x) 6=
f(x)−U(x)
Z(x) }
∣∣ < δ|D|. Hence Z(x) · h˜1(x) + U(x) ∈ L(f). Similarly there exists a polynomial
h˜2 = h˜2α,z of degree < d · dC − 1 such that (x− z)h˜2(x) + b ∈ L(gα).
Fix r˜1(x) (independent of α and z) to be the element in L(f) maximizing the probability
that r˜1(x) = Z(x) · h˜1(x) + U(x) given E1. Let E2 ⊆ E1 be the event that r˜1(x) =
Z(x) · h˜1(x) + U(x). It follows that Pr[E2] ≥ η/L.
Fix r˜2α(x) ∈ L(gα) maximizing the probability that r˜2α(x) = (x − z)h˜2(x) + b given E2
(note that r˜2α depends on α as the oracle gα was sent only after the verifier sent α), and let
E3 ⊆ E2 be the event where r˜2α(x) = (x− z)h˜2(x) + b. We have Pr[E3] ≥ η/L2. This implies,
Prα[Prz[E3] ≥ η/(2L2)] ≥ η/(2L2).
The event E3 implies
r˜1 |Mz= U |Mz= aα,z,
r˜2α(z) = bα,z.
Recall that bα,z was defined according to (13), so
bα,z =
|C|∑
i=1
αi ·
P i(aα,z(z ·M i1), . . . , aα,z(z ·M i|Mi|))
Qi(z) .
Substituting values for aα,z and bα,z and multiplying by Qlcm(z) we obtain:
Qlcm(z) · r˜2α(z) =
|C|∑
i=1
αi · P i(r˜1(z ·M i1), . . . , r˜1(z ·M i|Mi|)) ·
Qlcm(z)
Qi(z) . (14)
Both sides of the equation are polynomials of degree < d · dC + deg(Qlcm) in z. For every
α for which Prz[E3] ≥ η/(2L2) = (d · dC + deg(Qlcm))/q, we have at least d · dC + deg(Qlcm)
many z’s satisfying (14) and thus the two polynomials in (14) are identical. Let Gα(x) denote
the the right-hand side of (14) (replacing z with x).
So far we have:
Pr
α
[Gα(x) is divisible by Qlcm(x)] ≥ η/(2L2) > 1/q.
Note that the set of α’s satisfying this event forms a vector space. If its dimension was
less than |C| then the probability would have been ≤ 1/q. Hence this event holds for every α.
Substituting the elements of the standard basis, we get that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |C|,
P i(r˜1(x ·M i1), . . . , r˜1(x ·M i|Mi|)) ·
Qlcm(x)
Qi(x) is divisible by Qlcm(x).
Substituting any x for which Qi(x) = 0 gives P i(r˜1(x ·M i1), . . . , r˜1(x ·M i|Mi|)) = 0 which
implies that r˜1 satisfies all the constraints, as required. J
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5.5 Further optimizations for practical implementation
As we saw, it makes sense to work with several witness polynomials rather than one, as it
improves the prover complexity. Another optimization is to apply the RPT only once for
both h1 and h2 by taking a random linear combination of the two (and using Theorem 3).
To make this work, the prover writes the degree < d · dC polynomial g˜(x) as:
g˜(x) =
dC−1∑
i=0
xig˜i(xdC ),
where the g˜is are of degree < d, and it sends oracles to g˜i |D instead of g˜ |D′ . In total, we
will have to run RPT on w + dC polynomials of degree < d, so we choose only one evaluation
domain D ⊆ Fq satisfying |D| = dρ−1.
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A Preliminaries
Functions
For a set D, we will be working with the space of functions u : D → F, denoted FD. For
u ∈ FD we use u(z) to denote the zth entry of u, for z ∈ D. For C ⊂ D we use f |C to
denote the restriction of f to C. For two functions f, g : D → F we write f = g when the two
functions are equal as elements in FD and similarly say f |C = g|C when their restrictions
are equal as elements in FC .
Distance
We use ∆D(u, v) = Prz∈D [u(z) 6= v(z)] for relative Hamming distance, and omit D when
it is clear from context. For a set S ⊂ FD we use ∆D(v, S) = mins∈S ∆D(v, s) and
∆D(S) = mins6=s′∈S ∆D(s, s′) denotes the minimal relative distance of S. For u ∈ FD let
B(u, δ) denote the Hamming ball in FD of normalized radius δ centered at u,
B(u, δ) =
{
u′ ∈ FD | ∆D(u, u′) < δ
}
.
Linear codes
An [n, k, d]q-linear error correcting code is a linear space V ⊂ Fnq of dimension k over Fq with
minimal Hamming distance d. A generating matrix for V is a matrix G ∈ Fn×kq of rank k
such that V =
{
Gx | x ∈ Fkq
}
.
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Polynomials and RS codes
The interpolant of f : D → Fq is the unique polynomial of degree < |D| whose evaluation on
D is f . The degree of f , denoted deg(f), is the degree of its interpolant. The RS code evalu-
ated over domain D ⊂ F and rate ρ is denoted RS[F, D, ρ] = {f : D → F | deg(f) < ρ|D|}.
Sometimes it will be more convenient to work with degree rather than rate, in which case we
abuse notation and define RS[F, D, d] = {f : D → F | deg(f) < d}. We use capital letters like
P,Q to denote polynomials and when we say P ∈ RS[F, D, ρ] we mean that deg(P ) < ρ|D|
and associate P with the RS codeword that is its evaluation on D. We also use f˜ to denote
the interpolant of a function f .
A.1 List Decoding
I Definition 19 (List size for Reed-Solomon Codes). For u ∈ FD, a set V ⊂ FD, and distance
parameter δ ∈ [0, 1], let List(u, V, δ) be the set of elements in V that are at most δ-far from
u in relative Hamming distance. Formally, using B(u, δ) to denote the Hamming ball of
relative radius δ centered around u, we have List(u, V, δ) = B(u, δ) ∩ V .
The code V is said to be (δ, L)-list-decodable if |List(u, V, δ)| ≤ L for all u ∈ FDq .
For D ⊆ Fq, let L(Fq, D, d, δ) be the maximum size of List(u, V, δ) taken over all u ∈ FDq
for V = RS[Fq, D, ρ = d/|D|].
We recall the fundamental Johnson bound, which says that sets with large minimum
distance have nontrivial list-decodability. The particular version below follows, e.g., from [14,
Theorem 3.3] by setting d = (1− ρ)|D| and e = (1−√ρ− ε)|D| there.
I Theorem 20 (Johnson bound). Let V ⊂ FD be a code with minimum relative distance
δ ∈ (0, 1). Then V is (1−√1− δ−ε, 1/(2ε√1− δ))-list-decodable for every ε ∈ (0, 1−√1− δ).
When V is a maximum distance separable (MDS) code like a Reed-Solomon code of rate
ρ we have ρ = 1− δ, so V is (1−√ρ− ε, 1/(2ε√ρ))-list-decodable for every ε ∈ (0, 1−√ρ).
In particular, for Reed-Solomon codes this implies the following list-decodability bound:
L(Fq, D, d = ρ|D|, 1−√ρ− ε) ≤ O
(
1
ε
√
ρ
)
.
Extremely optimistically, we could hope that Reed-Solomon codes are list-decodable all
the way up to their distance with moderate list sizes. Staying consistent with the known
limitations [8], we have the following brave conjecture.
I Conjecture 21 (List decodability of Reed-Solomon Codes up to Capacity). For every ρ > 0,
there is a constant Cρ such that every Reed-Solomon code of length n and rate ρ is list-
decodable from 1− ρ− ε fraction errors with list size (nε )Cρ . That is:
L(Fq, D, d = ρ|D|, 1− ρ− ε) ≤
( |D|
ε
)Cρ
.
B Tightness of the one-and-a-half Johnson bound
Lemma 1 says that when V is a linear code with minimum distance λ, and u∗ is some element
that is δ-far from V , then for any u we have with high probability
∆(u∗ + xu, V ) ≥ min(δ, J (1.5)(λ) = 1− (1− λ)1/3).
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The rightmost term seems quite strange, as the J (1.5)(·) function is unfamiliar in other
settings of coding theory. However, as we show next, in certain settings this function gives
the correct bound!
I Lemma 22 (Tightness of one-and-a-half Johnson bound). For every member Vn of following
family of RS codes
{
Vn = RS[F2n ,F2n , ρ = 2−3] | n ∈ N
}
there exist u∗n, un ∈ FF2n2n satisfying
the following:
δmax , ∆(u∗n, Vn) = ∆(un, Vn) = 34 = 1− ρ2/3
∀x 6= 0,∆(u∗n + xun, Vn) ≤ 12 = 1− ρ1/3 = J (1.5)(∆(Vn))
Consequently, E[δx] ≤ J (1.5)(∆(Vn)) + o(1) ≤ δmax − 14 + o(1).
We shall need to following claim in our proof of the lemma.
B Claim 23. For every x ∈ F2n \ {0} there exists a polynomial Px(Y ) ∈ F2n [Y ] of the form
Px(Y ) = Y 2
n−1
+ xY 2
n−2
+ P˜x, deg(P˜x) < 2n−3.
that has 2n−1 distinct roots in F2n .
Proof. For x 6= 0 let βx = 1/x2, noticing βx is unique because the map β 7→ β2 is bijective
on F2n . Let Tr(Z) ,
∑n−1
i=0 Z
2i be the trace function from F2n to F2. Define
Sx = {y ∈ F2n | Tr(βxy) = 0}.
It is well known that |Sx| = 2n−1 because the trace function has 2n−1 roots in F2n .
So we define
Px(Y ) =
1
β2n−1x
· Tr(βxY ) = Y 2n−1 + 1
β2n−2x
Y 2
n−2
+ P˜x
= Y 2
n−1
+ xY 2
n−2
+ P˜x, deg(P˜x(Y )) < 2n−3.
The last equality follows because β2n−2x = x. J
Proof of Lemma 22. Consider Vn in this family and let F = F2n . Define u∗ : F→ F to be
the function u∗(y) = y2n−1 and let u : F→ F be the function u(y) = y2n−2 .
By Claim 23, for every x ∈ F \ {0} there is some vx ∈ Vn and Px with 2n−1 roots in F
such that
Px − (u∗ + xu) + vx = 0.
Then
∆(u∗ + xu, vx) = Pr
y∈F
[u∗(y) + xu(y) 6= vx(y)] = Pr
y
[Px(y) 6= 0] = 1/2.
Thus we get that for all x ∈ F \ {0}
∆(u∗ + xu, V ) ≤ 1/2.
On the other hand,
∆(u, V ) ≥ 3/4,
because for all v ∈ Vn, u− v is a polynomial of degree at most 2n−2 = |F|/4. This completes
the proof. J
I Remark 24. Since this example is based on Reed-Solomon codes, it also easily translates
into a limitation on the soundness of FRI. In particular, it means that the improvement to
the soundness of FRI given in Remark 5 is optimal.
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C DEEP Theorem – weighted version and general linear spaces
In this Section we provide a weighted version for Theorem 3 and generalize it to arbitrary
linear spaces.
C.1 Weighted version
For application to Reed-Solomon Proximity Testing, it is more convenient to have a weighted
version of the previous result. We briefly introduce some notation for dealing with weights,
and then state the new version.
Let u, v ∈ FDq . Let η ∈ [0, 1]D be a vector of weights. We define the η-agreement between
u and v by:
agreeη(u, v) =
1
|D|
∑
i∈D|ui=vi
η(i).
For a subspace V ⊆ Fnq , we define
agreeη(u, V ) = max
v∈V
agreeη(u, v).
I Theorem 25. Let ρ > 0 and let V = RS[Fq, D, d = ρ · |D|]. For z, b ∈ Fq, we let
Vz,b = {Q(Y ) ∈ V | Q(z) = b}.
For α < 1, let L∗ = L(Fq, D, d = ρ|D|, 1 − α) be the list-size for list-decoding V from
(1− α)-fraction errors (without weights).
Let u, u∗ ∈ FDq . For each z ∈ Fq, let Bz(X) ∈ Fq[X] be an arbitrary linear function.
Suppose that
Pr
x,z∈Fq
[agreeη(u∗ + xu, Vz,Bz(x)) > α] ≥ max
(
2L∗
(
d
q
+ 
)1/3
,
4
2q
)
, (15)
Then there exist v, v∗ ∈ V and C ⊂ D such that:∑
y∈C η(y) > (α− )|D|,
u|C = v|C ,
u∗|C = v∗|C .
Consequently, we have agreeη(u, V ), agreeη(u∗, V ) ≥ α− .
The proof is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 3 so we only highlight the changes.
First, we observe that if η1 : D → [0, 1] is the the constant function with value 1, then
agreeη(u, v) ≤ agreeη1(u, v) = 1−∆(u, v). Thus the set
{Q(Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(Q) ≤ d, agreeη(u∗ + xu,Q) > α}
is contained in
{Q(Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(Q) ≤ d,∆(u∗ + xu,Q) < 1− α}.
The size of this latter set is bounded by L∗, and thus the size of the former set is too.
The proof then proceeds as before, until the very end, where we have a set A′ ⊆ Fq, with
|A′| ≥ 2 , and polynomials P, P ∗ ∈ V such that for each x ∈ A′, agreeη(u∗+xu, P ∗+xP ) > α.
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Then we take C = {y ∈ C | u∗(y) = P ∗(y), u(y) = P (y)}, and our goal is to show that∑
y∈C η(y) > (α− )|D|. To this end, consider:
α <
1
|A′|
∑
x∈A′
agreeη(u∗ + xu, P ∗ + xP )
= 1|D| · |A′|
∑
x∈A′
∑
y∈D
(η(y) · 1u∗(y)+xu(y)=P∗(y)+xP (y))
= 1|D|
∑
y∈D
η(y)
(
1
|A′|
∑
x∈A′
1u∗(y)+xu(y)=P∗(y)+xP (y)
)
≤ 1|D|
∑
y∈C
η(y) + 1|D|
∑
y∈D\C
η(y) · 1|A′|
≤ 1|D|
∑
y∈C
η(y) + /2.
This implies that
∑
y∈C η(y) > (α− )|D|, and the rest of the proof is the same as before.
C.2 DEEP Lemma for general linear codes
Theorem 3 can be generalized to apply to arbitrary linear codes, and this is the focus of this
section. We explain the basic principles for an [n, k, d]q-linear code V with generating matrix
G ∈ Fk×nq , viewing codewords as evaluations of linear forms on the columns of G.
Let D ⊂ Fkq be the set of columns of G. A linear form ` ∈ F kq can be “evaluated” at any
any element x of D. Similarly, if we fix a set of points S ⊆ Fkq (thinking |S|  |D|), we may
evaluate the linear form ` at any point of S – this corresponds to evaluation outside the
original domain D.
If we are given a function u : D → Fq which is supposed to be the evaluations of a linear
form ` on D, we can ask about what the evaluation of this linear form at a point z ∈ S is.
This is the viewpoint from which the DEEP lemma generalizes to general codes.
We start with two functions u, u∗ : D → Fq (which are supposed to correspond to linear
forms, say ` ∈ Fkq and `∗ ∈ Fkq . We have a verifier who samples z ∈ S and asking for
a = `(z) and a∗ = `∗(z). Given these answers, the verifier now samples x ∈ Fq and computes
b = a∗ + xa which is supposedly equal to `∗(z) + `(z) (if u∗ and u are indeed codewords of
V ). The result below says that if S is the set of columns of an error correcting code with
good distance, and V has small list size for list-decoding up to radius δ, then with high
probability, the function ux = u∗ + xu has distance at least ≈ min{∆(u∗, V ), δ} from the
sub-code of V corresponding to the linear forms that evaluate to b on z.
I Definition 26 (Robust). A set S ⊆ Fk is called σ-robust if every subset of S of size σ
contains a basis for Fk.
The following claim is well-known in coding theory (cf. [19, Problem 2.8]).
B Claim 27. Fix a full-rank matrix G ∈ Fk×Nq , N ≥ k, and let C =
{
x ·M | x ∈ Fkq
}
be the
linear code generated by it. Then the set of columnss of G is σ-robust if and only if the
minimum distance of C is at least N − σ + 1.
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I Lemma 28 (DEEP method for general linear codes). Let V be an [n, k, d]q-code that is
(δ, L∗δ)-list decodable for some δ > 0, and fix G ∈ Fk×nq to be its generating matrix. Let
S ⊂ Fkq be a σ-robust set of size N . For z ∈ S, b ∈ Fq, let
Vz,b = {v ∈ V | v = G · `v AND 〈`v, z〉 = b}
where 〈v, z〉 = ∑ki=1 vi, zi.
Let u, u∗ ∈ Fnq . For each z ∈ S, let Bz(X) ∈ Fq[X] be an arbitrary linear function.
Suppose that for some  > 0 the following holds,
Pr
x∈Fq,z∈S
[∆(u∗ + xu, Vz,Bz(x)) < δ] ≥ max
(
2L∗δ
( σ
N
+ 
)1/3
,
4
2q
)
, (16)
Then there exist v, v∗ ∈ V and C ⊂ [n] such that:
|C| ≥ (1− δ − )n,
u|C = v|C ,
u∗|C = v∗|C .
Consequently, we have ∆(u, V ),∆(u∗, V ) ≤ δ + .
The proof is analogous to the proof in the Reed-Solomon case, and appears in Appendix D.
Discussion
For the special case of RS codes, the DEEP method can be used to locally modify the
problem and reduce degree. Indeed, the subcode Vz,b in the case of RS codes corresponds
is comprised of functions f : D → F that are evaluations of polynomials of degree d whose
interpolating polynomial Pf satisfies Pf (z) = b. From such a codeword, one can construct a
new codeword fz,b : D → F defined by fz,b(x) = f(x)−bz , which is well-defined for all z 6∈ D.
Notice that the transformation from f to fz,b is 1-local, meaning that each entry of fz,b is
constructed by making a single query to f . Furthermore, this transformation maps a subset
of the code RS[F, D, d] to the code RS[F, D, d− 1], so we may use this transformation in RS
IOPPs (as will done in the following section).
In contrast, for a general k-dimensional linear code V , the subcode Vz,b, while being an
affine subspace of V , has less structure. In particular, it is not clear how to locally convert
this subcode to a “nice” code of dimension k− 1. An interesting middle ground, left to future
work, is the case of algebraic codes like Reed Muller codes and Algebraic Geometry codes
which resemble RS codes.
D Proof of the DEEP lemma for general codes
Proof of Lemma 28. To simplify notation set η = max
(
2L∗δ
(
σ
N + 
)1/3
, 42q
)
, and let ux =
u∗ + xu.
Let E [x, z] denote the event “∃v ∈ List(ux, V, δ), 〈v, z〉 = Bz(x)”.
The assumption of Equation (16) now reads as
Pr
x∈Fq,z∈S
[E [x, z]] ≥ η.
Thus we get,
Pr
x∈Fq
[ Pr
z∈S
[E [x, z]] ≥ η/2] ≥ η/2 (17)
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Let
A =
{
x ∈ Fq | Pr
z∈S
[E [x, z]] ≥ η/2]
}
and notice |A| ≥ ηq/2.
For x ∈ Fq, pick vx ∈ V to be a member of List(ux, V, δ) that maximizes Prz∈S [P (z) =
Bz(x)]. Let Sx = {z ∈ S | 〈vx, z〉 = Bz(x)} and set µx = |Sx|/s. By definition,
|List(ux, V, δ)| ≤ L∗δ , and so by the pigeonhole principle, for each x ∈ A we have µx ≥ η2L∗
δ
.
For x, β, γ picked uniformly from A we have
Ex,β,γ∈A
[ |Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ |
s
]
= Ez∈S,x,β,γ∈Fq [1z∈Sx∩Sβ∩Sγ ]
= Ez∈S [Ex∈Fq [1z∈Sx ]3]
≥ Ez∈S,x∈Fq [1z∈Sx ]3
≥
(
η
2L∗δ
)3
>
σ
N
+ .
The second equality above follows from the independence of x, β, γ. The first inequality
is an application of Jensen’s inequality and the last inequality is by assumption on η.
Thus
Pr
x,β,γ
[|Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ | > σ] ≥ .
Note that Prx,β,γ [x, β, γ are not all distinct] < 3/|A|. Since |A| ≥ ηq/2 ≥ 2/2 ≥ 6/ we
have 3/|A| ≤ /2. Thus Prx,β,γ [x, β, γ are all distinct and |Sx ∩ Sβ ∩ Sγ | > σ] ≥ /2.
This means that there are distinct x0, β0 such that
Pr
γ
[|Sx0 ∩ Sβ0 ∩ Sγ | > d] ≥ /2.
Consider some γ where this happens. Let S˜ = Sx0 ∩ Sβ0 ∩ Sγ . Extend each of u∗, u to
functions over domain S by defining for all z ∈ S \ [n] u∗(z) = Bz(0) and u(z) = Bz(1), and
for x ∈ Fq let ux(z) = u∗(z) + xu(z). Since V is systematic, we define vx(z) = 〈vx|[k], z〉 and
thus extend vx to domain S˜. By construction we know
(x0, ux0), (β0, uβ0), (γ, uγ)
are collinear. So, in particular,
(x0, ux0 |S˜), (β0, uβ0 |S˜), (γ, uγ |S˜) ∈ Fq × FS˜q
are likewise collinear, as a special case. By definition of S˜, we get that:
(x0, vx0 |S˜), (β0, vβ0 |S˜), (γ, vγ |S˜) ∈ Fq × FS˜q
are also collinear. Since |S˜| > σ and S is σ-robust we conclude that vγ is uniquely determined
by vγ |S˜ . This allows us to conclude that
(x0, vx0), (β0, vβ0), (γ, vγ) ∈ Fq × Fnq
are all collinear, recalling that vx0 ∈ List(ux0 , V, δ).
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Thus, an /2-fraction of the γ ∈ A have the “good” property that (γ, vγ) is on the line
passing through (x0, vx0) and (β0, vβ0). Write this line as v∗ + xv and notice that for all
“good” γ we have vγ = v∗ + γv. Let A′ ⊆ A denote the set of good elements for this line,
recording that |A′| ≥ |A| · /2 ≥ 1/. By definition of List(ux, V, δ) and the assumption
vx ∈ List(ux, V, δ), we have that ∆(ux, vx) < δ for x ∈ A′.
Consider the set C ⊂ [n] defined by
C = {y ∈ [n] | u∗(y) = v∗(y) AND u(y) = v(y)} .
For each y ∈ [n] \ C there exists at most a single value of x ∈ Fq satisfying ux(y) = vx(y)
because
ux(y)− vx(y) = (u∗(y)− v∗(y)) + x · (u(y)− v(y))
has at most one value x on which it vanishes. This implies
δ ≥ Ex∈A′ [∆[n](ux, vx)] ≥ |[n] \ C|
n
·
(
1− 1|A′|
)
≥
(
1− |C|
n
)
· (1− ) ≥ 1− |C|
n
− .
Rearranging, we get |C|n ≥ 1− (δ + ) and this completes the proof. J
E The algebraic hash function
We now describe the algebraic hash function Hx.
The description of the hash function requires fixing some choices of certain subspaces.
For each i ∈ [0, r] we choose F2-subspaces L(i)0 and L(i), satisfying the following properties.
1. L(i)0 ⊆ L(i) with dim(L(i)0 ) = 1,
2. L(i+1) = q(i)(L(i)), where q(i)(X) is the subspace polynomial of L(i)0 ,
q(i)(X) =
∏
α∈L(i)0
(X − α),
thus this is an F2-linear map with kernel L(i)0 ). In particular, dim(L(i+1)) = dim(L(i))−1.
Let S(i) denote the set of cosets of L(i)0 contained in L(i).
Given x ∈ F and f : L(i) → F, the hash of f with seed x is defined to be the function
Hx[f ] : L(i+1) → F as follows. For s ∈ L(i+1), let s0, s1 ∈ L(i) be the two roots of q(i)(X)− s.
Let Pf,s(X) ∈ F[X] be the unique degree ≤ 1 polynomial satisfying
Pf,s(s0) = f(s0),
Pf,s(s1) = f(s1).
Then we define
Hx[f ](s) = Pf,s(x). (18)
Observe that Hx[f ](s) can be computed by querying f on the set {s0, s1} (this set is a coset
of L(i)0 , and we denote it by S
(i)
s ).
To understand Hx better, it is instructive to see what it does to RS(i). Let f ∈ RS(i).
The underlying polynomial f(X) thus has degree at most ρ|L(i)|. We may write f(X) in
base q(i)(X) as:
f(X) = a0(X) + a1(X)q(i)(X) + . . .+ at(X)(q(i)(X))t, (19)
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where each ai(X) has degree at most 1, and t ≤ ρ|L(i)|/2. Since the polynomials f(X) and
Pf,s(X) agree on the roots of q(X) − s, we get that f(X) ≡ Pf,s(X) mod (q(i)(X) − s).
From Equation (19), we get that
Pf,s(X) = a0(X) + a1(X)s+ . . .+ at(X)st.
In particular, for all x ∈ F,
Hx[f ](s) = Pf,s(x) = a0(x) + a1(x)s+ . . .+ at(x)st,
and thus
Hx[f ] ∈ RS(i+1).
F Proof of Lemma 12 and Lemma 13
We first prove Lemma 12.
Proof of Lemma 12. Set γ = max(α(i), 1− δ∗).
For simplicity, denote f (i) by f .
Recall the notation Pf,s from the definition of the algebraic hash function Hx in Section E.
We have that for each s ∈ L(i+1), Hx[f ](s) = Pf,s(x) is a linear function of x. Thus we can
write Hx[f ] = u∗+xu for u∗, u ∈ FL(i+1)q , and for any fixed s, we have the formal polynomial
equality Pf,s(X) = u∗(s) +Xu(s).
We are interested in bounding the probability of the event β(i+1) > γ + . In other
words, we want to bound the probability that there exists a polynomial Q(Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] with
deg(Q) < d(i+1) + 1 such that:
agreeθ(i+1)(u∗ + xu,Q) > γ + ,
Q(z(i)) = B(i)
z(i)
(x).
This is exactly the scenario of Theorem 25. That Lemma tells us that if the probability
in question is larger than ν∗, then there exist polynomials P (Y ), P ∗(Y ) of degree ≤ d(i+1)
and a set T ⊆ L(i+1) such that:
1
|L(i+1)|
∑
s∈L(i+1)
θ(i+1) > γ,
u|T = P |T ,
u∗|T = P ∗|T .
Let
Pˆ (X,Y ) , P ∗(Y ) +X · P (Y )
and notice that degX(Pˆ ) ≤ 1, degY (Pˆ ) ≤ d(i+1).
Consider the polynomial R(X) , Pˆ (X, q(i)(X)). We have
deg(R) ≤ 2d(i+1) + 1 = d(i) − 1 < d(i).
We claim that R agrees with f on T˜ =
⋃
s∈T S
(i)
s .
Take any s ∈ T and let S(i)s = {s0, s1} ∈ S(i) be the pair of roots of the polynomial
q(i) (X)− s.
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First we show that the polynomials Pf,s(X) and Pˆ (X, s) are identical. Indeed, Pˆ (X, s)) =
P ∗(s) +XP (s) = u∗(s) +Xu(s) = Pf,s(X). It follows that
f (s0) = Pˆ (s0, s) = Pˆ
(
s0, q
(i) (s0)
)
= R (s0)
and similarly f (s1) = R (s1). Therefore, R and f agree on T˜ , as claimed.
We now use the above information to show that α(i) = agreeη(i)(f,R) > γ, which
contradicts the definition of γ. Indeed,
agreeη(i)(f,R) =
1
|L(i)|
∑
r∈L(i)|f(r)=R(r)
η(i)(r)
≥ 1|L(i)|
∑
r∈T˜
η(i)(r)
= 1|L(i)|
∑
s∈T
∑
r∈S(i)s
η(i)(r)
= 1|L(i)|
∑
s∈T
|S(i)s | · θ(i)(s) Since θ(s) equals the average of η(r) | r ∈ S(i)s
= 1|L(i+1)|
∑
s∈T
θ(i)(s)
> γ.
This is the desired contradiction. J
Next we prove Lemma 13.
Proof of Lemma 13. By definition,
β(i) = agreeθ(i)(Hx(i−1) [f
(i−1)], {P (Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(P ) ≤ d(i) and P (z(i−1)) = B(i−1)
z(i−1)(x
(i−1))})
Next, by the properties of quotienting, Lemma 6,
β(i) = agreeθ(i)(Hx(i−1) [f (i−1)], {P (Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(P ) ≤ d(i) and P (z(i−1)) = B(i−1)z(i−1)(x
(i−1))})
= agreeθ(i)(QUOTIENT(Hx(i−1) [f (i−1)], z(i−1), B
(i−1)
z(i−1)(x
(i−1))),
{P (Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(P ) ≤ d(i) − 1}).
Now observe that η(i) is obtained from θ(i) by zeroing out coordinates in E(i), and the only
coordinates where f (i) can differ from QUOTIENT(Hx(i−1) [f (i−1)], z(i−1), B
(i−1)
z(i−1)(x
(i−1))) are
in E(i). Thus:
β(i) ≥ agreeθ(i)(f (i), {P (Y ) ∈ Fq[Y ] | deg(P ) ≤ d(i) − 1})
= agreeθ(i)(f (i),RS(i))
= α(i).
This completes the proof. J
